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Abstract 
This paper suggests a new procedure for separating the market-power effect from the efficiency effect when cost data 
are not available. We examine a panel of data on 177 mobile-voice operators in 45 countries from 1999:1 to 2004:2 
and find that a 1% increase in the market share of an operator increases its price-cost margin by 0.58-0.66%, but only 
a small share of this increase is due to a market-power effect.
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1. Introduction 
 
A seminal paper by Bain (1951) is the starting point of a large body of literature looking 
at the impact of different measures of industry concentration on profitability. Pioneer 
examples are provided by Cowling (1976), Cowling and Waterson (1976), Geroski 
(1981), Dickson (1982), Clarke and Davies (1982), and Geroski (1982) among others.  
A related field of research concerns with the attempt of separating the so-called market-
power effect from the so-called efficiency effect (see Demsetz 1973). The market-power 
effect is based on the argument that higher concentration leads to higher prices because 
competition decreases as concentration increases (higher concentration makes price 
coordination among industry members easier), while the efficiency effect is related to 
the argument that higher concentration leads to lower marginal costs because of 
economies of scale.              
In a recent article, Dickson (2005) briefly reviews the literature of the 1980s, stressing 
that the major contributions, generally related to the American manufacturing sector, are 
either inconclusive (see for instance Allen 1983, Chappell and Cottle 1985, and Martin 
1988) or contradictory (see for instance Peltzman 1977, and Kelton and Weiss 1989) or 
controversial (see for instance Smirlock et al. 1984, Shepherd 1986, and Martin 2002). 
We basically share this view.   
In the 1990s, the literature seems characterized by a generalized attempt of using the 
tools of the NEIO1 approach (see Iwata 1974, Appelbaum 1982, and Bresnahan 1982) 
for answering the old SCPP2 question of the separation between efficiency and market-
power effects. Examples are provided by Rosenbaum (1994) and Azzam (1997). 
However, an issue with the estimation of NEIO models (structural supply-demand 
models) is that they require the availability of data, namely cost data, which are rarely 
available, thus providing a reason why most studies are related to very specific US 
industries (such as cement, beef-packing, and so on).               
In the 2000s, most of the research effort looks mainly oriented towards the refinement 
of the methods of the 1990s, although several contributions present some innovative and 
path-breaking ideas. This paper focuses on one of these contributions. In particular, it 
focuses on the above-mentioned article by Dickson (2005) who suggests a new 
procedure for identifying and weighting market-power and efficiency effects, using data 
on the American manufacturing sector. The whole estimation exercise is performed 
using a fixed-effects estimator (and the ordinary-least-squares estimator as a 
benchmark). The author explores industry-level panel data from 1963 to 1992 and his 
procedure has three steps.  
In step-1, he estimates a standard price-cost margin regression and measures the 
positive effect of concentration on profitability, using a number of control variables 
(ratio of real industry capital stock to real output, annual growth rate of real industry 
output, and year effects). 
Then, in step-2, he estimates a price regression using the same explanatory variables of 
the price-cost margin regression estimated in step-1 plus an additional one: a proxy of 
the marginal cost. From the latter regression, the author obtains an estimate of the 
positive effect of concentration on price, holding the marginal cost constant. In this 
way, he obtains a direct measure of the market-power effect. 
                                                 
1 NEIO stands for New Empirical Industrial Organization. 
 
2 SCPP stands for Structure-Conduct-Performance-Paradigm.   
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Finally, in step-3, the author estimates his price regression without controlling for the 
marginal cost (i.e. he uses the same explanatory variables of step-1) and finds that 
concentration negatively affects price, thus providing indirect evidence of the efficiency 
effect. The explanation is simple: an increase in concentration, without holding the 
marginal cost constant, increases the price-cost margin (step-1) but reduces the price 
level (step-3). Hence, the coexistence of these two results must be explained by a 
reduction in the level of the marginal cost which more-than-counterbalances the 
reduction in the price level. Particularly, the efficiency effect is found to be bigger than 
the market-power effect (the latter is estimated in step-2).    
This paper builds on Dickson (2005) but suggests a different procedure for separating 
market-power and efficiency effects. Indeed, rather than measuring the market-power 
effect directly by estimating a price regression that holds the marginal cost constant, we 
measure the efficiency effect directly by estimating a price-cost margin regression that 
holds the price level constant. Particularly, we look at the impact of the market share of 
a firm on its price-cost margin (a practice in use since Gale 1972, and Kwoka 1979), 
and contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we explore firm-level 
panel data rather than industry-level data. Second, we focus on the international mobile-
voice industry rather than standard US sectors or industries. Third, our procedure can be 
used even if cost data are not available. Fourth, we find evidence reinforcing the 
conclusion of Dickson (2005) and Azzam (1997) that the efficiency effect dominates the 
market-power effect.          
 
2. Empirical approach 
 
This paper examines a panel of data on 177 mobile-voice operators in 45 countries over 
the period from 1999:1 to 2004:2. The data are provided by Merrill Lynch and extracted 
from the Global Wireless Matrix in its version of September 29th, 2004. Sample 
statistics are reported in Table I. Further details on the sample are provided by Andini 
and Cabral (forthcoming).  
Market share, ebitda margin3 and price level represent the three main variables of the 
empirical analysis in this paper. The market share of the operator i in country j at time t 
is measured as the number of subscribers of the operator i in country j at time t divided 
by the total number of subscribers in country j at time t. The ebitda margin is used as 
proxy of the price-cost margin although we partly agree with the criticisms associated 
with the use of accounting measures as indicators of economic profitability (see Fisher 
and McGowan 1983, and Fisher 1987). Its calculation is based on the total operator’s 
revenues from sales of both goods and services. It is worth stressing that voice traffic 
represents, on average, around 80% of total operator’s revenues. The price level is given 
by total revenues per minute of call, measured in euros (using quarterly exchange rates).   
Basically, we compare estimation results from the following two empirical models: 
 
ijyqijyq1qyji0ijyq slnebitdaln ξ+α+α+α+α+α+α=                                                   (1) 
 
ijyqijyq2ijyq1qyji0ijyq plnslnebitdaln ζ+β+β+β+β+β+β+β=                                    (2) 
 
Note that we control for firm (i), country (j), year (y) and quarter effects (q).  
                                                 
3 Earnings before interests, taxation, depreciation, and amortization, divided by operating revenues.  
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This paper focuses on the estimation of the effect of the market share on the ebitda 
margin, with and without a control for the price level. Putting it differently, the paper 
focuses on the coefficients 1α  and 1β . The coefficient 1α  gives the total impact of the 
market share on the price-cost margin, including both the efficiency effect and the 
market-power effect. The coefficient 1β , instead, gives the total impact of the market 
share on the price-cost margin, holding the price level constant. Hence, the latter 
coefficient provides a direct measurement of the total efficiency effect. Then, by 
subtracting the estimate of 1β  from the estimate of 1α , we get an indirect measurement 
of the market-power effect.  
Note that we only use vectors of specific effects as control variables in model (1), plus 
the price level in model (2). This choice can be justified on two grounds. First, on the 
theoretical ground, the first-order condition of a simple profit-maximization problem 
provides an equation where the price-cost margin of a firm in a given country at a given 
time (the so-called Lerner index) only depends on the market share of the firm, its 
conjecture about competitors’ behaviour (we do control for firms’ unobserved 
heterogeneity), and the market-demand elasticity in a given country at a given time (we 
do control for country, year and quarter effects). Second, on the empirical ground, the 
insertion of additional price-cost margin regressors to models (1) and (2) implies the 
risk of adding market-share-dependent covariates to these models and therefore the risk 
of poorly estimating the total effect of the market share on the price-cost margin 
because a share of this effect is captured by the market-share-dependent covariates. In 
addition, the explained variability of the price-cost margin in both models is relatively 
high, compared for instance to Dickson (2005).  
Further, note that the reason behind the choice of a logarithmic specification concerns 
with an easier interpretation of results, which are nevertheless robust to a model 
specification in levels.  
Finally, let us discuss the estimation techniques. Since both market share and price are 
endogenous regressors due to simultaneity with price-cost margin4, we use both the 
instrumental-variable-random-effects estimator (IVRE) and the instrumental-variable-
fixed-effects estimator (IVFE). As instruments, we use both the lagged value of the 
price level and the lagged value of the market share for model (2), while only the lagged 
value of the market share for model (1). Note that the values of market share and price 
at time 1t −  are likely to affect the values of market share and price at time t  but 
unlikely to be affected by the value of the price-cost margin at time t. As a benchmark, 
we also provide estimation results based on the standard estimators of random-effects 
(RE) and fixed-effects (FE).    
 
3. Results 
 
Since the first-stage regression results, presented in Table II, strongly support the choice 
of the instrumental variables5, we focus on the second-stage results.  
As shown in Table III, the total impact of the market share on the price-cost margin in 
model (1), including both the efficiency effect and the market-power effect, varies from 
                                                 
4 The value of the price-cost margin at time t is likely to affect the values of both market share and price 
at time t. 
 
5 Note that the models (1) and (2) are just-identified.  
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0.58 to 0.66. However, when holding the price level constant, the impact of the market 
share on profitability in model (2), measuring the efficiency effect, ranges between 0.52 
and 0.63. Hence, depending on the estimation technique, the market-power effect goes 
from 0.03 to 0.08. These results are summarized in Table IV.  
In sum, our evidence is consistent with the findings of Dickson (2005) and Azzam 
(1997). The market-power effect is dominated by the efficiency effect. If the market 
share of a mobile-voice operator increases by 1% then its price-cost margin is likely to 
increase by 0.58-0.66% but only a small share of this increase is due to a market-power 
effect. The latter is estimated between 4.55% and 13.33%.  
To conclude, this paper suggests a new procedure for separating the market-power 
effect from the efficiency effect when cost data are not available. We examine a panel 
of data on 177 mobile-voice operators in 45 countries from 1999:1 to 2004:2 and find 
that the market share of an operator increases its price-cost margin mainly through 
efficiency gains. 
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Table I. Summary sample statistics 
 
 
 
Obs. Mean St.Dev.  Min/Max 
Ebitda 
 
2292 0.33 0.13 0.01/0.77 
Market share  
 
3203 0.29 0.17 0.01/0.95 
Price  2009 0.20 0.10 0.02/1.14 
 
 
 
 
Table II. First-stage results 
 
IVRE 
 
IVFE  
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
                                   Endogenous* 
                               variables 
 
Instrumental  
variables 
 
Log. of 
market 
share 
Log. of 
market 
share 
 
Log. of 
price 
Log. of 
market 
share 
Log. of 
market 
share 
Log. of 
price 
Lagged** 
log. of market  
share  
 
0.93 
[0.000] 
0.93 
[0.000] 
–0.03 
[0.008] 
0.85 
[0.000] 
0.87 
[0.000] 
–0.07 
[0.000] 
Lagged** 
log. of price  
 0.02 
[0.000] 
0.86 
[0.000] 
 0.01 
[0.045] 
0.85 
[0.000] 
 
F-test of joint significance  
  
[0.000] 
   
[0.000] 
 
[0.000] 
 
P-values in square brackets 
 
* The endogenous variables are the dependent variables of the first-stage regressions  
** Previous quarter value  
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Table III. Second-stage results (dependent variable: log. of ebitda) 
 
 
 
RE FE IVRE IVFE 
 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Log. of market share 
 
 
0.60 
[0.000] 
0.52 
[0.000] 
0.59 
[0.000] 
0.53 
[0.000] 
0.58 
[0.000] 
0.55 
[0.000] 
0.66 
[0.000] 
0.63 
[0.000] 
Log. of price  
 
 
 0.12 
[0.005] 
 0.12 
[0.007] 
 0.09 
[0.072] 
 0.10 
[0.049] 
R-squared 
 
0.42 0.41 0.28 0.26 0.42 0.40 0.19 0.18 
Obs.  2291 1780 2291 1780 2194 1689 2192 1687 
 
P-values in square brackets   
 
 
 
 
Table IV. Efficiency vs. market-power effects 
 
 
 
RE FE IVRE IVFE 
Total effect ( 1αˆ ) 
 
0.60 0.59 0.58 0.66 
Efficiency effect ( 1βˆ ) 
 
0.52 0.53 0.55 0.63 
Market-power effect ( 11 ˆˆ β−α ) 
 
0.08 0.06 0.03 0.03 
 
Efficiency share 
 
86.67% 
 
89.83% 
 
94.83% 
 
95.45% 
 
Market-power share 
 
13.33% 
 
10.17% 
 
5.17% 
 
4.55% 
 
 
 
 
  
  
